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By Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson
Latin America’s flirtation with neoliberal financial restructuring within the Eighties and Nineties (the so-called Washington Consensus method) had the influence of accelerating source of revenue inequality in the course of the quarter. the purpose of this financial coverage was once partly to create the stipulations for reliable democracy via making sure effective monetary use of assets, either human and capital, however the widening hole among wealthy and terrible threatened to undermine political balance. on the middle of the trouble confronted via those new democracies is the query of responsibility: Are all electorate both able to protecting the govt. liable if it doesn't characterize their pursuits? during this publication, Michelle Taylor-Robinson investigates either the formal associations of democracy (such as electoral principles and the layout of the legislative and govt branches) and casual associations (such because the nomination approaches of political events and patron-client relationships) to determine what incentives legislators need to concentrate on the desires of terrible humans and thereby appropriately signify their interests.
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Extra resources for Do the Poor Count?: Democratic Institutions and Accountability in a Context of Poverty
Further, the chapter explores how Honduras’s combination of institutions affects the capacity of rich and poor people to sanction, the incentives that institutions give legislators to represent poor people, and the forms that representation is likely to take. Chapter 6 presents a role analysis of Honduran deputies, examining microlevel observable implications of the theory to explore the ways legislators operating within institutional constraints choose to do their job. This chapter applies Searing’s (1994) idea of legislators’ informal preferences roles, which argues that even within institutional constraints, politicians still make choices (see also Scharpf 1989).
First, I present a classical principal-agent model of democratic accountability to outline how accountability works, then how accountability can break down even when there is just one principal. Next, I look at the case of two principals with different preferences but equal capacity to monitor and sanction their agent. 22 I then consider how electoral rules, nomination procedures, and clientelism influence whom it is rational for legislators to represent. The final section of the chapter presents a step return function (Croson and Marks 2000; Goeree and Holt 2005) for 22.
S. politics. 11. See chapter 1 for the rationale for this decision. Taylor FM-End 9/14/10 11:36 AM 32 Page 32 do the poor count? legislators acting as individuals). ). 12 An elected official’s identity, self-image, and preferences are shaped by the institutional milieu, affecting whom the official represents and what form that representation takes. If citizens view legislators as unresponsive, they may develop a negative opinion of the legislature. They may begin to wonder why they are paying legislators’ salaries, and the congress may lose legitimacy in the people’s eyes.